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  Post Walrasian economics is the future of economics, or at least I’d like to think so. 
Actually, I started using the term a while ago and hoped that it would catch on, but it didn’t to 
any great extent. But I believe it should and in this paper I expand on my earlier discussion of 
Post Walrasian macroeconomics policy. (Colander and van Ess 1996) I divide the paper into 
three parts. First, I define what I mean by Post Walrasian macroeconomics. Second, I discuss 
some of the theoretical differences between Post Walrasian and Walrasian macro theorizing as 
they relate to policy. Finally, I discuss how an acceptance of Post Walrasian economics might 
change the focus of macro policy discussions. 
Definition and Terminology 
  I’m a historian of recent economic thought, which means I try to make what’s happening 
in the profession understandable to people outside the profession. That’s not an easy task, since 
often even those of us inside the profession don’t know what is happening. Classifications are 
important to historians of thought because they provide the framework through which we tell 
students the story of the development of economics.  
  Back in the 1960s, when I learned macroeconomics, it was presented by historians of 
recent economic thought as a debate between fairly well-specified and distinguishable schools of 
macro economists--Keynesians, neoclassicals, monetarists, and radicals. Those distinctions broke 
down in the 70s and 80s when the issues that had seemed to separate those groups evolved into 
other issues, or were simply dropped unresolved, as the profession moved on to new debates. 
This evolution led to a variety of new classifications—new classical, neoKeynesian, new 
Keynesian, Post Keynesian (with various hyphens and capitalizations)--and by the 1980s the 
classification situation could best be described as classification anarchy. By the 1990s, the 
debates in macro had further evolved, and even those new terms were no longer useful in 
capturing the differences among various economists on macro policy. The pedagogical reaction 
to that anarchy was to downplay differences among schools in the texts, and to present 
macroeconomics as a unified approach.
1 In the texts there were no longer Keynesians, 
monetarists, or Classicals; there were simply macroeconomists.  
  The tendency to downplay differences among macroeconomists was amplified because at 
the same time the debates in macro were evolving, the profession itself was evolving, causing the 
term “neoclassical” to lose much of its relevance as a descriptor of modern economics. (See 
Colander 2000a.) The economics that has emerged in the twenty-first century is significantly 
different from the economics described as neoclassical in the history of thought texts. Modern 
economics has loosened its connection to the holy trilogy—rationality, equilibrium, and greed--
and moved toward a much more comprehensive trilogy, which might be described as cognitive 
                                                 
1 Textbooks lag the profession by a decade at least, and while the intermediate texts present a unified approach, the 
approach they present is not consistent with the intertemporal equilibrium framework of modern theoretical 
macroeconomics. Instead, they present an older IS/LM framework based on demand and supply for money and 
savings/investment equilibria. More recent work, such as that found in the Handbook of Macroeconomics (Taylor 
and Woodford 1999) provides a dynamic stochastic intertemporal equilibrium foundation for the new integration 
(McCallum and Nelson, 1999) and will likely be working its way into the intermediate texts in the next few years. 
[See Colander forthcoming (b)]. Post Walrasian Macro Policy 
awareness, purposeful behavior, and sustainability. This broader trilogy allows a much broader 
range of models than did the old trilogy, and the acceptance of this new trilogy eventually will 
change the way economics is done.
2 
  The degree to which the old trilogy is violated varies among economists, but what I mean 
by this evolution is that top graduate schools no longer automatically shun individuals who do 
not maintain a belief in the old trilogy. Thus, we see work in behavioral economics, non-linear 
dynamics, evolutionary game theory, statistical pattern analysis (econophysics), and 
experimental economics as acceptable elements of conventional economics. Examples abound: 
Peter Howitt is at Brown; Buz Brock is at Wisconsin; Mat Rabin is at Berkeley, David Laibson is 
at Harvard; Xavier Gabaix is at MIT; the list could be significantly expanded.  
  The change is ongoing, but undergraduate students have little sense of the change since it 
has not yet shown up, other than in the ubiquitous boxes that students don’t read, in standard 
undergraduate texts. In my view, however, good conventional economists are open to issues 
framed in this broader trilogy, and cutting-edge work in economics is usually tied in some way to 
these changes. (Of course, I define “good economist” as an economist who is open to at least 
thinking about these issues.)  
  As I struggled with the problems of relating the debates that I felt still existed in 
macroeconomic policy to students, I found myself developing finer and finer characteristics—for 
example, comparing the new new Keynesian economics with the new neoKeynesian economics. 
As I reflected upon these distinctions I came to the conclusion that the Keynesian-based 
comparisons at this point were beyond the grasp of any non-specialist, and thus not especially 
helpful as classifiers. (Colander 1998) This led me to give up on the old classifications and move 
to a new Walrasian/Post Walrasian classification that was not burdened by the historical baggage 
of the earlier classifications.  
  Others, such as Sam Bowles and Herb Gintis (1993) and Joe Stiglitz (1993) did the same 
(although we used it somewhat differently), and the term, Post Walrasian became part of the 
vocabulary of those economists who have a proclivity toward classifications. However, while it 
is part of the vocabulary, it has hardly caught on; I would say it is emerging, but not yet 
emergent, which means that its use has not gone beyond the occasional mention in the journals. 
But I am hopeful that it will catch on, because I see it as a useful term to help students and 
outsiders understand recent developments and in the debates in macro and macro policy.  
  Now that I’ve given the context, let me turn to what I mean by Post Walrasian 
economics. In Colander (1996) I specified three characteristics of Post Walrasian economics. 
Those three characteristics were:  
1.  Multiple equilibria and complexity 
2. Bounded  rationality 
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2 With that evolution, not only did the term neoclassical lose its relevance, so too did the term heterodox, since 
heterodox had generally been defined in opposition to a neoclassical orthodoxy. As the orthodoxy evolved and 
broadened, what heterodox economists were in opposition to became hazier, and in the 2000s it is no longer 
possible to easily distinguish orthodox from heterodox economics in terms of content. These ideas are expanded 
upon in Colander, Holt, and Rosser. (forthcoming) Post Walrasian Macro Policy 
3. Institutions  and  non-price coordinating mechanisms 
These are all aspects of the movement away from the holy trilogy and toward the broader and 
looser foundational requirements of theorizing. None of these are characteristics of Post 
Walrasian economics alone, and, in fact, most are aspects that heterodox economists have been 
pushing for years. What’s changed in the past decade is that mainstream economics is beginning 
to embrace them and include research based on them as part of the conventional research 
program. The Post Walrasian classification encompasses both mainstream and nonmainstream 
economists.  
  What hasn’t followed from conventional economics is a significant discussion of the 
policy implications of this expanded research program. Instead, in an effort to tie policy to 
theory, the conventional discussion of policy almost inevitably remains in reference to a 
Walrasian model.
3 Thus, much of the Post Walrasian policy discussion has primarily been within 
the heterodox community, because its members have been willing to follow up the policy 
implications of the broader holy trilogy.
4  
  I suspect that the reason why conventional economics has tied its policy approach to the 
Walrasian model is that once one moves to the broader trilogy, a model can be devised to support 
a wide range of policy, and theory becomes far less useful. Put bluntly, in terms of drawing out 
policy conclusions from the theory, giving up the holy trilogy means that almost anything goes, 
and that formal theory can no longer be used as a direct guide for policy. When you have models 
with multiple equilibria, path dependency, non-linear dynamics, endogenous tastes, institutional 
restrictions, and historesis, there are so many degrees of freedom that theory presents little in the 
way of restrictions on policy. With that many degrees of freedom a sufficiently capable modeler 
can devise a theoretical model to support any policy. What this means is that if one accepts the 
broader trilogy, theory must acquire a different purpose; its use must change from theory guiding 
policy to theory and models aiding one’s intuition.  
Theoretical Differences and Policy 
  To see the policy differences between the Walrasian and Post Walrasian approaches it is 
helpful to consider their underlying visions. Walrasian economics has, as its underlying vision, 
the standard Walrasian general equilibrium model of the economy. It focuses on a unique 
equilibrium model where market failures are characterized as deviations from optimality. Its 
research strategy is to develop that model from its microfoundations, and analyze what a rational 
individual would do if he or she had full information about the economy. Put another way, 
Walrasian economics is the study of how infinitely rational individuals operate in a rich 
information environment.  
  Post Walrasian economics has a different underlying vision. It sees the economy as too 
complicated to have a meaningful microfoundation. It sees individuals as bright, but not bright 
enough to exhibit full rationality. Full intertemporal rationality is impossible to even contemplate 
since agents are seen as changing and evolving. For example, the agent as a child is only 
                                                 
3 This is true in both micro and macro; in this paper I concentrate on macro policy issues. 
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4 Once in a while a conventional economist explores policy outside the standard model. An example is Joe Stiglitz’s 
(2002) recent work.  Post Walrasian Macro Policy 
tangentially related to the same agent as a retiree; the experiences of growing up shape the 
rationality of the adult.
5 
  On the macro level the result of agent interaction in such a complex environment should 
be chaos, but that chaos is prevented by the development of institutions and codes of ethics that 
limit agents’ actions. Thus, rather than destabilizing the economy, preventing the achievement of 
full equilibrium, as is the case in the Walrasian vision, institutions and bounded rationality 
become ways in which the economy is stabilized. The central question for Post Walrasians is not: 
Why does the economy exhibit instability and fluctuations?; it is: Why does it exhibit as little 
instability as it does? The Post Walrasian answer is that bounded rationality and institutions limit 
individuals’ actions to a subset that maintains aggregate stability. In such a complex environment 
institutions naturally become a central element in the study of the economy and the rationality 
assumptions used in any model are institution-specific. Thus, in contrast to Walrasian 
economics, post Walrasian economics is the study of how reasonably bright individuals operate 
in an information-poor environment.
6  
From Control to Muddling 
  In relating theory to policy, this change in focus requires a change in the way we think 
about welfare economics and applied policy. Conventional welfare economics follows what 
might be called an economics of control approach. It assumes that policy makers know the 
underlying generating functions of the economy, and that the policy goal is to optimize a social 
welfare function subject to constraints. Not only are agents assumed to be infinitely bright and 
operating in rich information sets, but so to are policy makers. Conventional welfare economics 
is the analysis of how infinitely bright policy makers operate within rich information sets.  
  The Keynesian economics I learned (which is more appropriately called neoKeynesian) 
also used an economics of control approach, following a functional finance view in which macro 
policy makers operated in an information rich environment. Abba Lerner (1944) presented both 
micro and macro policy approaches in his Economics of Control, which played a key role in 
establishing the textbook foundations for economic policy analysis. The basis for policy in the 
two branches of economics was not parallel. In micro, both agents and policy makers were 
assumed to operate in rich information environments and to have infinite computing capabilities. 
However, in macro that was not the case. Macro welfare analysis--functional finance--differed 
from micro welfare analysis because it assumed that agents operated in an information-poor 
environment and had limited computing capabilities, but that policy makers operated in a rich 
information environment and had infinite computing capabilities.  
  As the microeconomic foundations of macroeconomics were explored and the two 
approaches integrated, the neoKeynesian policy analysis, which was based on Lerner’s 
functional finance welfare approach, was attacked by New Classical economists on consistency 
grounds. New Classical economists argued that if policy makers had full information, rational 
individuals should also be assumed to have full information available to them. And if agents 
                                                 
5 In such an environment policy not only affects agents’ actions; it also affects agents’ underlying utility function, so 
a social welfare specification of optimal policy based on agents’ utility functions is impossible unless one works 
with agents’ policy invariant utility functions. Work in the foundations of behavioral economics and meta-utility 
analysis is beginning to explore this issue. 
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6 I see the early Keynesian economics as a movement toward this Post Walrasian vision, although it was quickly 
derailed into a Walrasian framework. Post Walrasian Macro Policy 
have that information, then many of the benefits of Keynesian policies are eliminated; in fact, 
most of the Keynesian problems of stabilization and equilibrium at undesirable unemployment 
levels would not exist.
7 Fluctuations are simply reflections of shifts in intertemporal choices, or 
irreducible noise in the stochastic system, and unemployment is simply the result of 
intertemporal inconsistencies combined with institutional rigidities. This lack of consistency 
between agent and policy maker assumptions played an important role in the movement away 
from Keynesian economics and the development of the modern dynamic stochastic intertemporal 
equilibrium approach to macro.
8 
  Model consistency between agents’ information sets and policy makers’ information sets 
seems logically desirable; if policy makers have access to that information, then why shouldn’t 
the agents in the model also have access to it, at least at a cost? So modern Walrasian macro is 
defensible on these consistency grounds. The Post Walrasian argument is that there is another 
way to achieve the consistency; rather than assume both individuals and policy makers have full 
rationality and rich information sets, as conventional Walrasian macro does. The Post Walrasian 
approach is to start from the other direction-- to assume both policy makers and agents are 
operating within an information-poor environment, and, while bright, are not infinitely bright. In 
the Post Walrasian vision no agreed-upon model of the economy is available. Not only are agents 
muddling, using rules of thumb, and lacking a firm foundation in what they are doing, so too are 
economic policy makers and economists. In the muddling through vision economic policy 
becomes far less grand; it becomes the search for rules of thumb that work temporarily in a 
specific institutional environment. As institutions evolve, these rules of thumb also evolve. 
Muddling through is a pragmatic exploration of policy that is used when one does not have the 
correct model, or when one does not know a method of determining the correct model.  
  This difference in view has significant implications for how we think of economists’ role 
in policy, and in how we relate theory to policy. In Post Walrasian economics there is no hope 
for finding an optimal policy; instead all we try to do is to help policy makers make slightly 
better choices than they otherwise would have.  
  I see Post Walrasian policy work operating on two fronts. One of these fronts is what can 
be called a research and development front; it explores alternative institutional environments that 
might improve the operation of the economy. An example of theoretical research that serves as a 
foundation for such applied policy is Mundell’s optimal currency work (Mundell 1961) that 
explored the nature of currency systems that were not tied to nations’ borders. Another is Abba 
Lerner’s and my work on market based incomes policies (Lerner and Colander 1980) that 
explored the nature of price controls and the aggregate constraint that unit of account stability 
places on the steady state equilibrium of a system. Such speculative work is about the 
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address (Lucas 2003) in which he argued that stabilization has little welfare gain, and that the policy focus of 
macro should be on growth. 
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8 The reason for the downfall of Keynesian economics is debatable, and my argument does not depend on it. Post 
Keynesians question whether Keynesian economics truly made that assumption, and argue that it is neoKeynesian 
economics, not the true Keynesian economics, that has fallen. Paul Davidson’s focus of Keynesian economics on 
the nonergodicity of the system is consistent with the argument I am making. As I discuss in Colander (2003), the 
functional finance approach to macro policy remained the policy makers’ approach. It also remained the approach 
to policy presented in the undergraduate texts because of the lags involved in translating theory into policy-
relevant models, and because both the policy makers and the texts had to deal with real-world policy issues. Post Walrasian Macro Policy 
implications of different institutional arrangements. It is broad and suggestive and is designed to 
get people thinking about issues in a different way than they previously have. 
  The second front of Post Walrasian policy is much more specific. It accepts the existing 
institutions and considers how those existing institutional arrangements might be improved. 
Whereas the research and development work is broad and general, this work is specialized and 
often technical. The researcher begins from specific problems and then chooses a model 
incorporating general insights that seem to fit. The problems define the research topic, not the 
model and data availability as is generally currently the case.
9  
  Much economic policy work in microeconomics follows what I am calling this Post 
Walrasian methodology. It is little tied to abstract Walrasian theory, is not dependent on hyper 
rationality, and is institution-specific. It was central to Milton Friedman’s approach (see Hirsch 
and diMarchi 1990) and is the approach that “reduced form” labor economists currently use. 
These reduced form economists have a loose general theoretical conception of theory, but most 
of their work is statistical in nature and does not depend on formal general equilibrium theory. It 
is pragmatic and ad hoc: Do charter schools improve educational outcomes? Does the minimum 
wage increase unemployment significantly?  
  “Structuralist” labor economists have attacked that reduced form approach as incorrect, 
since it has no formal welfare foundation, but in the Post Walrasian view, that attack is 
meaningless since there exists no formal welfare foundation for policy. The relevance of Post 
Walrasian applied policy work depends not upon formal welfare analysis, but upon the strength 
of the arguments it makes—what McCloskey (1998) calls its rhetoric, but which might better be 
called heuristic argumentation based on educated common sense and technical knowledge.  
  Early Keynesian’s and monetarist’s applied policy work used this reduced-form applied-
policy approach, but then in debates, Keynesians started structuring their models in a Walrasian 
framework and adding a general equilibrium foundation to their analysis where individuals were 
assumed to have infinite computing powers. Tobin’s work in expanding the asset-analysis in the 
Keynesian model is an example. (Tobin 1980) As that happened, Keynesian economics evolved 
into neoKeynesian analysis. However, in their policy analysis these Keynesian economists kept 
the functional finance welfare foundations. New Classicals attacked that work as lacking a full 
micro foundation, and that reduced form Keynesianism has faded in importance.  
  In its place New Classical and New Keynesian work has made Walrasian macro theory 
an extension of micro theory. Today, younger conventional macroeconomic theorists use a 
stochastic intertemporal equilibrium vision of the macro economy. In today’s conventional 
applied macro, specific policy proposals are pulled from highly abstract models that assume 
individual optimization in a full information environment. An example is Chari and Kehoe’s 
analysis of a primal approach to fiscal policy focusing on optimal taxation (Chari and Kehoe 
1999). In it they try to shed light on how monetary and fiscal policy should be set over the long 
run and over the business cycle. They do so by integrating optimal taxation literature into a 
Walrasian general equilibrium model. They arrive at four policies (p. 1,673) including the need 
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9 I recently interviewed Harvard students and asked the difference between sociology and economics. They said that 
in sociology the important problems define the research agenda, whereas in economics the available models and 
data sources define the research agenda. Post Walrasian economics expands the number of basic models and 
increases the range of acceptable data, and follows an approach closer to the sociological approach, but at a more 
technical level.  Post Walrasian Macro Policy 
to have capital taxes going to zero after the first period and the interest rate ultimately going to 
zero. 
  That is not the type of policy work that is seen as useful in the Post Walrasian vision. In 
Post Walrasian theory models are not representations of realities, but aids in thinking about real 
problems. The policy implication from one model will not be sufficient to draw any real-world 
policy conclusions; instead, it will be tied with historical understanding and results from other 
models, and by a heuristic approach that provides one with an initial view of what the problem is 
and whether the analytic models are providing useful insights. Tom Schelling has called this 
approach “vicarious problem solving” in which agents are assumed to “operate in a purposeful 
manner, aware of their values and alert to their opportunities.” Using this approach the researcher 
figures out what an agent might do by imagining him or herself in the person’s position, as best 
he understands that position, and decides what that person will likely do given that person’s 
aims, values objectives, and constraints. (Schelling 2003) This vicarious problem solving 
approach places limits on the formal analytic models we use. It tells us whether the model’s 
results make sense.  
  Assumptions of formal models are chosen to match the best representation of the existing 
reality that one can vicariously get, and the results of the formal model are matched or calibrated 
to the real world data. That is where the new work in developing the new foundational 
assumptions of economics comes in. In developing ones theory, one uses information gathered 
from experiments, insights of behavioral economists, and even surveys, such as that of Truman 
Bewley’s work on wage rigidities. (Bewley 1999) When analytic theory fails, one turns to 
whatever sources of guidance work. Where one can, one develops agent-based models in which 
the rationality of agents is evolved from system sustainability conditions rather than assumed. 
And when theory fails one falls, back on statistical analysis of data such as vector auto regression 
analysis loosely guided by theory.
10  
Applying Unfinished Theory to Policy 
  The distinction between Walrasian and post Walrasian economics can be overdone. 
Modern Walrasian economics has gone beyond the standard approach, and there are few 
economists left who are still limiting their research to the strict Walrasian program. Thus, the 
relevant contrast for Post Walrasian is with what might be called the extended Walrasian 
program. This extended Walrasian program loosens the strict Walrasian assumptions in a number 
of ways. For example, it loosens the information and rationality requirements, and includes an 
analysis of bounded rationality. Thomas Sargent’s work can be seen along these lines. (Sargent 
1993) It also no longer accepts the need for a unique equilibrium, and thus includes multiple 
equilibria, which in turn make the specification of rationality more complicated, and necessitates 
a meta-analysis involving equilibria selection mechanisms.  
  The extended Walrasian program also allows conventions and institutions to be 
embedded in multiple stages in the optimization process that lead to temporary rules, or limits on 
agent’s behavior in the form of institutions. The macro branch of the new institutional economics 
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proposals from loosely formulated theories and statistical analysis without the burden of having a firm 
noncontextual formal microfoundation for theory—in muddling through one cannot have a firm foundation for 
theory. Examples of the modern reduced-form approach include Ray Fair’s and John Cornwall’s work ((Fair 
2001a, 2001b); Cornwall 2001). Post Walrasian Macro Policy 
and evolutionary game theory could fit within this extended Walrasian program. Optimization 
still occurs but it is a multiple optimization process that is done in reference to multiple variables 
changing at different speeds. These emerging, extended Walrasian, research programs are far 
from their Walrasian origins, and, in my view, eventually the Post Walrasian/Walrasian 
distinction will itself become untenable as the two approaches converge. But that is years off.  
  Where the Post Walrasian approach differs from the Walrasian approach is in how to 
apply theory to policy in the interim. The Walrasian approach to developing the model is to 
modify one assumption at a time. The difficulty for policy analysis with this “remove one 
assumption at a time” approach is that the assumptions are interdependent. If assumptions are 
interdependent, policy results of models that have modified the assumptions are suspect. For this 
reason, when applying models to policy, mainstream economists generally take a conservative 
approach to policy analysis, and tie their policy discussion to the developed formal Walrasian 
model, not to the extended Walrasian model. Most conventional macro policy work and 
discussion, such as work in inflation targeting, monetary independence, optimal fiscal policy, 
and growth policy, has followed a conservative connection between theory and policy; 
connecting policy to the Walrasian models we know and not to the new untested extended 
Walrasian models that have not yet been significantly explored. 
  The Post Walrasian approach agrees that the results of models in which assumptions are 
adjusted one assumption at a time are suspect and not especially useful for policy guidance. But, 
in most cases, neither is the full information, full rationality model. In Post Walrasian theory one 
is attempting to develop models in which assumptions are adjusted equally on the margin so that 
the nature of interrelationships in maintained. This is, of course, not easy to do, since each of the 
deviations from the core assumptions makes the modeling more complicated, and the addition of 
all of them—institutions, bounded rationality, and multiple equilibria--makes the analytic 
modeling process from micro foundations integrating all of them impossible. 
  It is this conservative approach to relating theory and policy that, in my view, today 
differentiates heterodox and conventional economists. The conventional approach of basing 
policy on developed theory has given macro policy a highly conservative cast, and has prevented 
conventional economists from exploring a variety of policy issues. It has been left to non-
mainstream economists and the occasional conventional economist, such as Joe Stiglitz, to push 
the policy envelope. Thus, I would argue that much of this nonconventional work on policy fits 
nicely under the Post Walrasian heading, and it is in policy where heterodox economists play the 
most important role.  
  Rather than starting with a general formal vision of the model, Post Walrasian policy 
analysis starts with a specific policy problem and attempts to model an economy where the 
assumptions match the observed characteristics in the economy. Instead of having a single well-
specified formal model, it has a variety of well-specified formal models, as well as a variety of 
informal modeling techniques. It uses a combination of these to add insight into policy problems. 
Eventually this approach will be systematized, and in a book I am currently working on with Buz 
Brock, we are attempting to do so in what we call the economics of muddling through.
11 
  In our approach the first step in any policy analysis is to place it into a category of 
models. Is it a Walrasian general equilibrium type problem, in which case computable general 
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equilibrium models may provide some insight? Is it a non-linear type problem, in which case 
statistical mechanics models may be helpful? Is heterogeneity likely to be important, in which 
case agent-based models may be necessary to provide some guidance as to how the events will 
transpire? Is the problem likely one of multiple equilibria, where the equilibrium selection 
mechanism will likely become the focal point of the analysis? Is the problem too complicated for 
formal analytic specification? If so, then straight data analysis, such as vector auto regression and 
co-integration, may provide useful insights? As I see it, the Post Walrasian economists will come 
to a problem with a set of statistical and analytical tools to solve problems that policy makers 
have. How does one tell which approach works? Through a study of the data and history of the 
problem. In the muddling through approach economists are closer to engineers, who study 
particular problems using a variety of models, than they are to scientists. 
  I sometimes like to picture the difference in the Walrasian and Post Walrasian approaches 
to theory and policy by reference to the building of medieval cathedrals. These cathedrals were 
built following a Post Walrasian approach. The builders did not rely on scientific laws to guide 
the building, but instead on accumulated rules of thumb of what worked and what didn’t. The 
building proceeded by trial and error. Different methods of construction would be pushed to the 
limit until a cathedral caved in somewhere, and then the rules of thumb would change. As the 
stored knowledge increased, the cathedrals became more grandiose, even without a specific 
understanding of the laws underlying them. That understanding came much later. Post Walrasian 
policy follows that same approach. It is conducting policy without a full knowledge of the 
general laws of the economy, if there are any. What you can find, at best, are general rules of 
thumb for how things have worked in the past, and possible some exploitable patterns. Walrasian 
economics follows a different approach to policy; it is a search for the underlying architectural 
plans of the economy. 
A Change in Goals 
  Another significant change that I believe occurs when one takes a muddling through 
approach to policy rather than an economics of control approach involves the goals of policy. For 
a variety of reasons Walrasian economic policy has focused on efficiency—interpreted as 
maximum output regardless of distribution of that output—as the goal of policy.
12 This is in part 
due to the acceptance of a unique equilibrium and stability of the system, and in part due to the 
evolution of policy analysis, where economists attempted to remain value free in their analysis. 
  Because Post Walrasian work relies less on analytic models, and more on simulations, 
and on reduced form, heuristic, and agent-based models, which can better handle disaggregation 
and heterogeneous agents, it can better consider issues of distribution, and thus equity and the 
total output/distribution tradeoff will become a more important element in policy analysis than it 
currently is.  
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12 The addition of other goals of policy highlights a terminological shortcut that economists have made when 
discussing policy. That shortcut is talking about efficiency as a goal of policy. Efficiency, in and of itself, cannot 
be a goal of society. Efficiency is achieving some outside determined goal as cheaply as possible. Economists have 
taken to using efficiency as a shorthand for referring to the goal of achieving the highest level of market output. 
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measures and goals, and that the demands are homothetic so that redistribution would not change the measure of 
aggregate output. But as soon as other goals are included, the term efficiency most appropriately is used as a 
method incorporating all goals. Thus, what is usually called efficiency should be called maximizing total output. Post Walrasian Macro Policy 
  The need to include equity in policy analysis has often been remarked upon. But other 
societal goals are also likely to get more focus. System resilience is one of these goals. In 
multiple equilibria models, questions of shifts from one equilibrium to another become central to 
the analysis, and the stability of that equilibrium becomes a policy issue. An important policy 
question that economics currently does not shed much light on is: Will the institutional structure 
be sufficiently resilient to withstand the shocks that hit it? If it is not, the economy might well 
shift to a completely new equilibrium as the institutional structure changes.
13 Specifically, if one 
can rank equilibria, the resilience of the system to shocks becomes an important policy issue. 
Increasing the resiliency of the economy at a good equilibrium becomes an important policy goal 
to complement distribution and total output goals.  
  There is a strong case to be made for a negative tradeoff between resiliency and 
maximizing total output, because maximizing total output often involves using a single “most 
efficient” method of production. But using a single method of production tends not to be 
resilient, and if some problem develops with that method, it can cause a sudden shift to another 
equilibrium. A policy may be efficient, in the sense of achieving maximum output, but that 
equilibrium may not be resilient, and one may well decide that a less efficient output with more 
resiliency is better.  
  A third change in goals that Post Walrasian economics will likely include involves 
determining policy invariant normative goals of society, thereby integrating normative goals 
directly into the policy analysis. As behavioral economics deals with meta utility functions and 
individual irrationalities, these can be built into policy. And as the new agent-based models give 
us insight into such issues, we can expect policy goals integrated into the models to become 
more complicated.  
Conclusion 
  Let me conclude with some general observations about some changes in thinking about 
specific macro policy that I believe will occur with an adoption of a Post Walrasian approach. 
One is that aggregate demand will be given another look as a determinant of growth, since in 
path dependent and multiple equilibrium models it can significantly change the equilibrium. 
Growth analysis will not solely focus on supply side issues; aggregate demand and supply will 
be interrelated, and will be analyzed as interdependent. (Setterfield 1999, Colander 1999). In 
monetary policy, I would see more of a focus on incomes policies as a way of lowering steady-
state unemployment. These policies have a potential role in models where aggregate equilibrium 
does not necessarily require micro equilibrium and the price adjustment process exhibits 
asymmetries. 
  The argument for these policies will be dependent on models and data analysis, but those 
models will not tell us whether the policies are good ones or should be implemented; they will 
simply provide food for thought and reflection—an input into the broader social decision 
process, not the decision process itself. The motto of neoclassical economics was there’s no such 
thing as a free lunch. The economics of control changed that to a motto where free dinners were 
available to economic controllers through the science of economics. The motto of muddling 
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13 In Colander (2000b) I argued that deflation--downward price level flexibility--would have such effects and cannot 
be considered an acceptable adjustment mechanism. This, I believe, was the early Keynesian view of price level 
flexibility, and much of early Keynesian applied policy analysis considered maintenance of the system. Post Walrasian Macro Policy 
through goes back to there’s no such thing as a free lunch, but adds the proviso that once in a 
while you can snitch a sandwich, and policy analysis is designed to snitch a few.  
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